Media Matters - "Media Matters"; by Jamison Foser "I believe in the usefulness and validity of the telling anecdote -- the seemingly small story that reveals a broader truth about a politician or other subject," Carney wrote. And who can blame him? For the reader, an anecdote -- a "short account of an interesting or humorous incident" -- is often more accessible and enjoyable than a dry recitation of statistics and facts. Similarly, it isn't hard to imagine that relating an anecdote is more enjoyable for the reporter, as well. So if a journalist stumbles upon an anecdote that "reveals a broader truth about a politician or other subject," who can blame him or her for using it?

But there is a danger or three in reporting by anecdote.

This interchange between two columnists prompted an insightful analysis of the dangers of anecdote in reporting by J. Foser. He points out that 1. people in the media are forced into creating or avoiding the creation of anecdotes; 2. the ‘anecdote’ reporting perpetuates the repeated recounting of metaphors that aren’t true; 3. many anecdotes that are true are “not telling” in the sense suggested by Carney above. He illustrates this by the following example:

Pretend for a moment that Naomi Wolf had told Al Gore he should wear earth tones. What would that have told us?

It could have told us, as countless journalists have claimed, that Gore wasn’t “comfortable in his own skin.” That he didn’t know who he was. That he was a big phony who would do anything to win.

But, just as plausibly, it could have told us that Al Gore — like the vast majority of Americans — occasionally asks for a second opinion when assembling an outfit.

Quite obviously, there are many interpretations in a given story that is being used metaphorically to “understand” a point (i.e. blended with another story) that can be activated not only based upon the internal structure of the two frames but also given the formal context of social negotiation of narrative veracity. This can be done both subconsciously and consciously (although with a strong automatic element) and both locally and globally. Strangely enough, there usually seem to be roughly two opposing interpretations that play a role (but there can be many more).

Clearly, the negotiation of “truth” and “understanding” is a matter of situationally-embedded ethical action both on the part of the speaker and the recipient. It is not a question of transcendental epistemology providing heuristics for determining what’s true. Foser offers a useful guide for action for the negotiation of the metaphorical meaning:

When news consumers encounter "telling anecdotes," they should think about what the anecdote really means:

1. Is the anecdote verifiably true?

2. Is the anecdote illustrative rather than anomalous?

3. Does the anecdote illustrate something that is verifiably true, or is it merely a convenient vehicle for suggesting something the reporter believes but cannot prove?

4. Does the anecdote illustrate something that is not only verifiably true, but is also important to understanding how the candidate would govern or how the issue would affect people? Or is it just pointless snark?

Funnily enough, I saw a similar list recently in a draft of a paper on philosophy of education. Foser implies two seemingly incompatible things (but not in a bad way): 1. that his list could be seen as somehow revealing of a new strategy that both journalist and readers should employ 2. his list is somehow a common sense approach that both readers and journalists fail (through lack of X) to employ regularly.

Both of these are both ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. 1. Reading this list just before reading/writing an anecdote-laden story (and what stories aren’t) could certainly make readers/writers more aware of its conceptual complexity and its blending mechanisms. But on the other hand, this is clearly something speakers and readers already do in many surprising and complex (but not systematic) ways. (Gamson’s work on working class politics discussions was particularly revealing.) 2. Even though (as pointed out above) Foser’s list described strategies language speakers commonly employ on text, their common sense value depends on a variety of folk theories of meaning and truth. One such is illustrated immediately following the list in a conclusion to his treatise:

Ideally, of course, journalists would think about these things before repeating the "telling anecdote" in the first place. Doing so shouldn't be hard. It merely requires a commitment to telling the truth, to reporting rather than guessing.

Quite obviously we can't quite have negotiated (illustrative) truth and transcendental objective truth at the same time. Of course, there is the situational configurational truth (Naomi Wolf said "X Y Z" to Al Gore on occasion "Q") but that is relatively infrequent. And factual inaccuracy doesn't necessarily disqualify the point (although it does undermine the credibility of the speaker). Also, there is no guarantee that a reader / writer following Foser's algorithm will arrive at an interpretation that is acceptable to us or to an independent observer. Fulfilling point 1 often difficult and sometimes impossible (but by far the easiest to accomplish). 2-4 are entirely up for negotiation and are subject to the same misinterpretations Foser criticizes. That's not to say they're not useful reminders but they are not the panacea often sought in this context.

Now for the real kicker. The mother’s question to a littering child: “What would happen if everyone did that?”. What would happen if everyone followed Foser’s rules? My contention is almost nothing. Precisely because of the difficulties and the necessity to negotiate the metaphorical application of anecdotes. True, some egregious nonsense wouldn’t be promulgated by the media. But the larger truth negotiation “climate” would probably remain the same. Here’s a “configurationally largely true” (largely because of possible memory lapses on my part). A friend of mine who grew up in Austria was trying to convince me that the Austrian’s were better media consumers than Czechs because in secondary school they read speeches by Hitler and analyzed them for manipulation (among other things). Not too long after that (less than a year, I recall) Jörg Haider’s party posted a major success in the Austrian elections. Clearly, exposing everyone to these strictures did not “help”.

Participants in public discourse exhibit a strange mix of autonomy* of and enthrallment by the prevailing frames (narrative, image schematic, folk theoretical). This tug of war is what makes social science so difficult but also so important.

*Howard Becker et al.’s thoughts on autonomy in prisons, schools and other restrictive institutions needs to be mentioned in this context (and a lot of other contexts).